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 ABSTRACT 
  
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a particularly important element for 
accelerated growth, technical innovation and enterprise restructuring of countries, as 
well as capital account relief. The determinants of FDI are thought to be 
macroeconomic conditions, political climate, institutional factors, labor costs, location, 
human capital, infrastructure, host country’s trade openness and the prospect of 
European Union (EU) membership for the countries in the EU accession process. Since 
the beginning of their transition, Central East European Countries have attracted a 
considerable amount of FDI. 
Turkey, on the other hand, has performed quite poor in attracting FDI, despite 
her renowned economic potential and geographic advantages. However, in late 2005 
and 2006 first half, we have seen that the FDI inflow into the country has increased 
significantly. There is no doubt that, opening of negotiations on October 3rd  2005 has a 
crucial role in this increase. It is very likely that this latest surge in FDI will proceed 
hand in hand with the progress of EU accession process. 
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ÖZET 
  
Doğrudan yabancı yatırımlar, ülkelerin büyümelerini hızlandırmaları, teknolojik 
yenilikleri ve girişimleri şekillendirmeleri ve sermaye girişi sağlamaları açısından 
önemlidir. Doğrudan yabancı yatırımı davet eden unsurların (determinantlar); 
makroekonomik koşullar, politik ortam, kurumsal faktörler, iş gücü maliyeti, yatırım 
yeri, beşeri sermaye, altyapı, ticaret açıklığı ve AB’ye giriş sürecinde olan ülkeler için 
beklenen AB üyeliği olduğu düşünülmektedir. Orta ve Doğu Avrupa ülkeleri AB’ye 
giriş sürecinde kayda değer oranlarda doğrudan yabancı yatırım çekmişlerdir.  
Öte yandan Türkiye; ekonomik potansiyeli ve coğrafi avantajlarına rağmen 
doğrudan yabancı yatırım çekme konusunda zayıf bir performans sergilemiştir. Ancak 
2005 yılının sonu ve 2006 yılının ilk yarısında, ülkeye doğrudan yabancı yatırım girişi 
artmıştır. Hiç şüphesiz ki, bu artışta 3 Ekim 2005 tarihinde AB ile başlayan 
müzakerelerin etkisi önemli olmuştur.  Bu son dalga, çok muhtemeldir ki, AB’ye giriş 
sürecinde artarak devam edecektir.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Globalization, the growing integration of economies and societies around 
the world (World Bank, 2005), is not a new phenomenon. The economic activity 
between people on different geographic locations has existed for centuries. The 
unique side of today’s globalization is the rapid pace at which it is accelerating. 
This is also why globalization today not only includes the exchange of goods and 
services, but also can be specified as the integration of trade, capital flows, labor 
or technological transfers between nations (Dutt, 2001). Siphambe (2003) states 
the dimensions of globalization as economic, political and cultural; all of which 
have a social impact. In this study, the economic side is analyzed in better detail 
and it is mentioned that on the economic side, there are five key features of 
globalization:  
(i) Rapidly expanding international trade, facilitated by newer technologies 
among others. A growth in foreign trade as a share of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) is commonly used as an indicator of globalization. 
(ii) Increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) and capital flows. 
(iii) Increasing internationalization of production, distribution and marketing 
of goods and services as a result of the adoption of new organizational forms 
of production by multinational enterprises and growth in capital markets and 
FDIs. 
(iv) Growing global competition among producers and suppliers of goods 
and services. 
(v) Adoption of economic reforms and liberalization of trade and investment 
policies undertaken by developing countries 
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As an economic outcome of globalization; FDI plays an extraordinary and 
growing role in global business. One of the most obvious consequences of 
globalization is the fact that it accelerates and intensifies competition. This leads 
to adopt and develop new strategic approaches not only for multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), which are doing business abroad, but also local enterprises in 
order to survive. In European Union Foreign Direct Investment Year Book 
(2005), it is mentioned that FDI plays a key role in the globalization process as an 
important element of international relations and their development. While 
supplementing trade, FDI creates more direct and deeper links between 
economies. It is a source of extra capital, encourages efficient production, 
stimulates technology transfer and fosters the exchange of managerial know-how. 
It is thus believed to improve the productivity of business and make economies 
more competitive. In this study, FDI data was used as a tool for measuring the 
evolution of the globalization phenomenon. With the trends of globalization, 
liberalization in foreign currency and trade regimes, the volume of FDI increased 
throughout the world. Since the early 1980s, world FDI flows have grown rapidly 
-faster than both world trade and world output. (OECD, 2001).  
FDI has also been a widely discussed topic in the context of European 
Union (EU). In various researches, the correlation between the FDI attractiveness 
and EU membership process has been analyzed and most of the studies have come 
to a consensus that one of the key benefits of the EU enlargement process is the 
boost it gives to foreign direct investment.  
Although the EU-15 is still far from a consensus on the need for ongoing 
enlargement, the accession countries themselves have been enthusiastic with the 
 2
EU integration process. Of the many discussion bases, economic improvement 
and growth prospects have been the main motives to make the EU membership 
attractive for these countries. Membership criteria require that an accession 
country improve and maintain economic soundness, harmonize the legal 
infrastructure with the Union’s Acquis and remove trade barriers. These criteria 
are also taken as positive economic targets by these countries and appear as 
benefits to stem from integration with the EU. 
Of course, these prospects are also closely watched by the interests of 
global investors, since the establishment or relocation of facilities to these 
promising economies are getting more and more feasible and profitable during the 
course of integration. Therefore, it is generally acknowledged that the FDI stocks 
in these countries have increased towards and upon accession to the EU. Inflows 
of investment to CEE countries have increased sharply since 1994, when the EU 
committed itself to enlarging. 
Turkey’s being an emerging market and an EU candidate state as well as a 
growing export partner for foreign companies have been the key motives for 
developing the purpose of this study. Current EU negotiations added on to the 
interest and importance to study the background to and the impact of EU 
accession of Turkey on MNEs’ choices to engage themselves in FDI in Turkey. 
Turkey is situated on the crossroads between Europe and Asia with a 
population of 70 millions. Its strategic geographical location is significant as it 
adds value to the country’s economic potential and creates market opportunities 
for foreign investors. Along with China, India, Russia and Brazil, Turkey has been 
named to be one of the ten emerging markets in the world by the World Bank as 
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well as the US Department of Commerce (The World Bank, Erdal & Tatoğlu, 
2002). During 2004, Turkey’s economic growth rate was 8.9%, which was mainly 
triggered by exports. Moreover, Turkey is a quarter of the size of the EU in terms 
of geographical area and has a population that is one-fifth of that of the EU-25. 
This fact puts the country among the top 25 economies in the world in terms of 
GDP. (FDI Magazine, 2004). On January 1st 1996, a Customs Union (CU) 
between Turkey and the EU came into effect. Turkey is the only country to have a 
CU agreement with the EU without being a member state. The CU allows the free 
circulation of industrial goods and processed agricultural products and has 
resulted in a closer economic and political relationship between the EU and 
Turkey. Customs duties and charges have been abolished and quantitative 
restrictions such as quotas are prohibited. The CU transferred most of the EU's 
trade and competition rules to Turkey and made the Turkish economy even more 
open to FDI.  
Although Turkey should be an interesting market for foreign investors 
both because of the increasing growth rate and its geographical location, she 
lagged behind other emerging economies as well as 10 new EU member states.  
FDI inflows into CEE countries increased sharply since 1994, after the public 
commitment made by EU about Eastern enlargement in Essen European Council. 
The fact that the total FDI stock has risen by 7-fold between 1994 and 2005 in 
CEE-Countries recurs to the mind that there could even be a correlation between 
Turkey’s performance, which is far below its potential, and CEE countries’ 
successful FDI attracting performance. 
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In this context, this study is analyzing the case of FDI inflows into the new 
member states of the EU, in comparison to and with a special emphasis on 
Turkey’s FDI experience. The study initially examines the definition and 
determinants of FDI and its effects on the host economy; then discusses the 
impact of EU accession process on FDI performance of both Turkey and CEE 
countries. Finally by presenting econometric models, the study investigates if 
Turkey’s FDI attraction performance was affected by the performance of CEE 
countries between the years 1994 and 2005 and also the impact of major 
economic determinants on Turkey’s FDI performance.  
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Discussion of the problem 
Despite the presence of economic prerequisites and a diminishing number 
of barriers to entry, FDI in Turkey has remained quite low (FDI Magazine, 2004), 
especially when compared to other emerging markets such as the CEE countries, 
Far Eastern and Latin American countries (Erdal &Tatoğlu, 2002). However, it 
should be emphasized that FDI in Turkey is increasing, even though the progress 
is relatively slow (Turkish Treasury Department statistics, 2005). 
The aim of this study is to identify the impact of EU accession process on 
the FDI performance of Turkey. Moreover, it also tries to discuss the main 
reasons and factors that are supposed to be behind the investment decisions of the 
companies that have engaged in FDI in Turkey and in CEE countries during the 
EU accession process. Finally, it tries to make an analysis about the effect of CEE 
accession process on Turkey’s FDI performance and the impact of major 
economic determinants on Turkey’s FDI performance. 
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Statement of the Problem 
1. What is the impact of EU accession process on candidate countries’ FDI 
performance? 
2. Did CEE Countries’ FDI performance in the EU Accession period affect 
Turkey’s FDI Performance in any way?   
3. What are the impacts of economic determinants on Turkey’s FDI 
Performance? 
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1) LITERATURE REVIEW ON FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
 
 
1.1. Definition of FDI 
There are several descriptions of FDI in literature. According to IMF and 
OECD recommendations; “Direct investment is the category of international 
investment that reflects the objective of a resident entity in one economy (direct 
investor) of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct investment 
enterprise) resident in another economy.” (Falzoni, 2000). In another expression 
by IMF and OECD, Foreign Direct Investment is defined as “an incorporated or 
unincorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor owns 10% or more of the 
ordinary shares or voting power of an incorporated enterprise or the equivalent of 
an unincorporated enterprise. Direct investment enterprises may be subsidiaries, 
associates or branches”. (Duce, 2003) 
 
1.2. Determinants of FDI 
FDI is a particularly important element of economic integration, because it 
opens possibilities for accelerated growth, technical innovation and enterprise 
restructuring, as well as capital account relief (Garibaldi et al (1999); Holland and 
Pain (1998)). In literature, there are numerous studies why foreign firms choose to 
invest abroad. The determinants of FDI are thought to be macroeconomic 
conditions, political climate, institutional factors, labor costs, location, human 
capital, infrastructure, trade openness of the host country, and the prospect of EU 
membership for the countries in the EU accession process. 
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One of the major determinants of FDI is reasoned by the motives for 
investing abroad instead of investing at home. Dunning (1977; 1988) represented 
OLI (Ownership, Location, Internalization) paradigm in order to explain the 
motivation driving firms to invest overseas and the reason why one location is 
selected in preference to another. At this point, Dunning has identified four 
generic types of strategic motives for international investment: 
- Market seeking 
- Efficiency seeking 
- Resource seeking 
- Asset seeking 
Market seeking or horizontal FDI motives are the correlation between the 
host economy’s market size and FDI flows. In resource-seeking FDI, investors 
would like to invest in the countries where they can acquire resources such as raw 
materials, labor and natural resources at a lower real cost. Efficiency-seeking or 
vertical FDI is undertaken when a firm benefits from setting up different plants at 
different locations for the sake of economies of scale in order to minimize factor 
costs. According to Dunning (2002), FDI in developing countries has shifted from 
market-seeking and resource-seeking to (vertical) efficiency-seeking, as firms are 
expected to relocate some of their production facilities to low cost developing 
countries as a consequence of globalization effect on prices. 
Loewendahl (2001) reveals that asset-seeking FDI is the most recent 
motive for FDI to be identified. The major aim in the asset-seeking FDI is to 
access and exploit technological assets in overseas countries especially in the 
form of mergers & acquisitions and technology agreements. In this sense, 
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although the developed countries are considered as the main recipients, there are 
also developing countries such as Hungary, India and Brazil attracting research & 
development projects. According to Loewendahl, cost differences are only likely 
to play a critical role in determining investment location when the investor needs 
to choose between short-listed countries, which are likely to be part of the same, 
sub-regional market.  
There are many reasons why foreign firms consider macroeconomic 
stability as necessity to invest. It is widely accepted that macroeconomic 
conditions play a significant role in attracting FDI. Low inflation rates and stable 
exchange rates are used as the key factors in verifying the stability and the 
strength of the economy and provide a degree of certainty to the future of the 
economy and the projections of the firms in profit considerations. Moreover, a 
stable macro-economic environment usually implies a stable political 
environment. (Balasubramanyam, 2001) 
According to Michalet (1997): “an indispensable precondition for 
encouraging foreign investment is to have a stable political and economic climate, 
and a transparent and nondiscretionary legal and regulatory framework.” 
Institutional factors such as corruption and political instability are key negative 
determinants of FDI as corruption can discourage FDI by inducing higher costs of 
doing business. (Wei 1997, Makusen 1998) 
Domestic market size and differences in factor costs are highlighted as 
determinants for the location of FDI by Markusen and Maskus (1999), Lim (2001) 
and Moosa (2002). Foreign firms seeking a market to invest are more attracted to 
the country with higher growth rate of GDP as it indicates a larger potential 
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demand for their product. Market-related factors are more about the traditional 
determinants of FDI. In an earlier study, Agarwal (1980) argued that the market 
size of the host country is the most important factor for the attractiveness of FDI. 
Also in many studies, such as Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Tsai (1994); FDI 
determinants are revealed as the market- related variables such as GDP, GDP per 
capita and GDP growth and population. 
There are controversial arguments regarding the effect of labor cost on 
investment incentives. On the one hand, while some authors have claimed that 
higher wages do not always deter FDI in all industries; on the other hand, it is 
asserted that a high nominal wage- other things being equal- deters FDI, 
especially for the firms which engage in labor-intensive production activities.1  
While some studies have shown no significant role of labor costs, some others 
have shown the positive relationship between labor costs and FDI as higher wages 
indicate higher productivity.2 According to Lucas (1998), the importance of 
human capital tends to be small, when a host country is more appealing to labor-
intensive FDI. Contrarily, according to Fung, Iizaka, and Parker, (2002), labor 
skill is more significant for a host country where more capital and technology 
intensive investment projects are concentrated. 
Fung, Iizaka, and Parker (2002); also found that better developed regions 
with superior quality of infrastructure are more attractive to foreign firms. 
Infrastructure facilities including transportation and communication networks are 
                                                 
1 See studies that find no significant or a negative relationship of wage and FDI are Kravis and 
Lipsey, 1982; Wheeler and Mody, 1990; Lucas, 1993; Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994; 
Wang and Swain, 1995; and Barrell and Pain, 1996. 
2 For positive relationship between FDI and wage, see Saunder, 1983; Schneider and Frey, 1985; 
Moore, 1993; and Love and Lave-Hidalgo, 2000. 
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also found as important determinants of FDI in the studies of Langhammer 
(1991). 
Trade related FDI is analyzed in depth by more recent studies. Export 
orientation is found to be the strongest variable for attracting FDI according to 
Sing and Jun (1995). In Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova (1998), tariff-jumping 
hypothesis is addressed in the context of a panel analysis on the effects of host 
country reforms on FDI. In their study, as the effects of import tariffs on FDI tend 
to be negative in a time series context, they come to a conclusion that “over time 
in countries, trade liberalization has become the more important motive for FDI”. 
Another strong determinant is the prospect of EU membership. It is 
considered to be the major motive driving firms to invest in the accession 
countries, which will be analyzed in depth in Section 2. 
 
1.3. The Impact of FDI on the Host Economy 
FDI has become an important tool for development of many countries. 
There is general agreement about the positive impacts of FDI on the welfare of 
receiving countries. The benefits of FDI concerning the capital market, 
technology transfer, market access, investment opportunities and export 
promotion are among the factors attracting FDI inflows from a host country 
perspective. There is broad consensus that foreign direct investment has a 
favorable effect on the host economy and especially on economic growth. For 
over two decades now, several international organizations such as the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization and divisions of 
United Nations have been promoting FDI as an essential instrument for boosting 
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economic growth, technology spillovers and other benefits. In accordance with the 
reports of these organizations, FDI is believed to raise the level of productivity 
(which in turn is presumed to enhance economic growth) of a host economy in at 
least three ways: 
- Inviting superior productivity of foreign firms  
- Creating spillover effects of FDI which are beneficial for domestic 
competitors  
- Increasing competition in the domestic market, at least in highly 
concentrated industries 
Besides, international investment can either bring access to foreign 
technologies and new working practices or make available new products and 
process that embody foreign knowledge, helping to close the ‘idea gaps’ as Romer 
puts it in his renowned 1993 article.  
Yet, on the other hand, a study in 2002 by Carkoviz and Levine 
contradictorily suggests that the exogenous component of FDI does not exert a 
robust independent influence on growth. The authors discuss that the growth 
effects of FDI remain unclear and that the empirical evidence in this regard is 
divided. In a parallel view, a different study states that FDI in manufacturing 
sector has a significant and positive effect on economic growth in the host 
economies whereas FDI inflows in non-manufacturing sectors do not play a 
significant role in enhancing economic growth. (Wang, 2003) 
According to Zacharov and Kusic (2003), for the recipient countries it is 
not the amount of FDI that plays a significant role, but contribution to the 
economic development. FDI does not only increase production in real sector but 
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also facilitates economic modernization and transfer of know-how. Furthermore, 
foreign investment creates additional employment in the host country. FDI flow is 
one of the major ways of technology transfer. By providing new technology and 
investment goods, the competitiveness of goods and services in the host country 
will improve, which will lead to higher sales on international markets. FDI 
supplies not only new technology but also advanced management techniques. 
These entire positive spillover effects of FDI inflows are believed to accelerate 
growth in the recipient country. The authors also pointed out the positive 
correlation between the amount of FDI and the growth of GDP and work 
productivity. With FDI inflows, the recipient country also benefits from accessing 
to new markets that contributes to increase export incomes. New market 
experience for the recipient country leads to better quality production and this 
helps to raise competitiveness. Moreover, they emphasize that FDI is a source for 
financing balance deficits and thus host country improves its credit liability, 
which in turn facilitates access to other financial sources.  
There have been many studies in the last decades that analyze the 
correlation between trade and FDI. Some of them have investigated if trade 
creates FDI in the end, or vice versa. Another issue is the substitution effect 
between these two. This was also debated publicly in Turkey; if the Customs 
Union and increased trade with EU countries could negatively affect the amount 
of incoming FDI, since the European companies could choose to easily export 
instead of investing. In Turkey’s case, we have seen that this has not happened. 
Between 1994 and 1996, it was believed that the decrease in tariff rates would 
increase the exports to Turkey and this would reduce FDI inflows. Contrarily, the 
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performance of Turkey between these years cannot be explained by substitution 
effect between trade and FDI. While every step of integration with the EU (trade-
related, bureaucratic, legal…etc.) has helped increasing FDI inflows, any 
economic or political instability deteriorates FDI performance of a country.  
Theory suggests that the correlation between trade and FDI is complex and 
involves many parameters. Sakakibara and Yamakawa (2003) state that this 
correlation may vary by the product, economic sector and across different 
countries. The type of FDI (whether it is resource-seeking or export 
oriented…etc.) may affect the import and export patterns of the host country. The 
authors defend that usually trade comes first, which in turn creates FDI. In the 
later stages, this FDI causes increased trade. Another important point mentioned 
by Sakakibara and Yamakawa (2003) is that the debate of trade vs. FDI is 
changing into the discussion of international production networks. Since the costs 
of communication and transportation have improved, it is now a question of 
where to locate the production and export bases for the multinationals. China, for 
example, is a popular destination of export-oriented FDI, causing increased raw 
material imports into the country, as well as exports of semi-finished and finished 
products. Therefore, the important issue to discuss according to Sakakibara and 
Yamakawa (2003) is not whether FDI and trade are substitutes, but instead, it is 
how multinationals decide their production and export locations. Aizenman and 
Noy (2005), on the other hand, discuss in their literature review that the major 
argument in this field is that increased FDI results in increased trade. The authors 
refer to an older study of themselves, and state that causality between commercial 
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openness (trade) and aggregate financial openness (FDI) is strong in both 
directions.   
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2) IMPACT OF EU ACCESSION PROCESS ON FDI 
PERFORMANCE 
 
2.1. The Relation Between EU Accession and FDI Flow  
According to Eurostat (1997: 39) “European companies have a tendency to 
respond to globalization pressure by enhancing the division of labor through FDI 
within the EU rather than to third countries.” This means that the EU membership 
makes a country more attractive for FDI from other EU countries. On the other 
hand, with the EU membership a country also attains the opportunity to get a 
share from the FDI inflows to the EU from third countries.  
The last European Union enlargement, took place in 2004, introduced 
eight countries from CEE to the EU. Experience from previous enlargements 
suggests that joining the EU will increase trade flows between the new member 
states and other EU countries and will also attract higher levels of FDI to the 
transition economies (Holland and Pain 2000). 
Bevan and Estrin (2000) made an analysis about whether or not EU 
membership can be viewed as a determining element of the operating business 
environment, and this may directly influence the rate of FDI flows in transition 
economies. According to them, the prospect of EU membership might be viewed 
by potential investors as reducing country risk; for meeting the requirements of 
EU admission represents an external validation of progress in transition and also 
because ultimate EU membership implies guarantees in terms of macro economic 
stability, institutional and legal environment and political stability. They suggest 
that countries that take part in the EU accession process benefit from increased 
FDI while the relative position of the delayed entrants could deteriorate and 
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therefore EU announcements tend to widen divisions in terms of FDI among 
delayed entrants and candidate countries.  They show that key announcements of 
progress in EU accession have impacted directly upon FDI receipts but have not 
influenced country credit ratings. The study comes to a conclusion that The 
Agenda 2000 announcement by the European Commission induced a bifurcation 
between the ‘first wave’ transition countries and the remainder of their sample. 
This process triggers FDI, which also improves country credit ratings with a lag, 
hence increasing future FDI receipts. Consequently the authors suggested that the 
accession progress has the potential to induce virtuous cycles for the frontrunners 
but may have serious consequences for the late comers as the expected amount of 
FDI may not be received.  
Since the start of transition period, accession countries have attracted a 
considerable amount of FDI. FDI inflows into CEE candidate countries increased 
sharply since 1994, after the public commitment made by EU about Eastern 
Enlargement in Essen European Council. In 1990, while the accession countries 
accounted for 2.1 percent of world GDP, they attracted only negligible amounts of 
FDI, less than 0.1 per cent of the 1990 total. In 2001, the same eight countries 
accounted for just over 1.75 percent of world GDP, while attracting over 2.2 per 
cent of 2001 world FDI flows. In 2002 these accession countries attracted 3.2 per 
cent of total world FDI inflow.  
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 Table 1: FDI inflows to CEE countries, and its share of total world inflow 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of data from UNCTAD 
mn $ 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
World 259.469 341.086 392.922 487.878 701.124 1.092.052 1.396.539 825.925 716.128 632.599 648.146
Czech Republic 869 2.562 1.428 1.300 3.718 6.324 4.986 5.641 8.483 2.101 4.463
Estonia 215 202 151 267 581 305 387 542 284 891 926
Hungary 2.286 5.104 3.300 4.167 3.335 3.312 2.764 3.936 2.994 2.162 4.167
Latvia 214 180 382 521 357 347 413 132 254 300 647
Lithuania 31 73 152 355 926 486 379 446 732 179 773
Poland 1.875 3.659 4.498 4.908 6.365 7.270 9.343 5.714 4.131 4.123 6.159
Slovakia 273 258 370 231 707 428 1.925 1.584 4.094 669 1.122
Slovenia 117 151 174 334 216 107 136 370 1.686 337 516
Total 5.879 12.188 10.454 12.083 16.203 18.579 20.333 18.366 22.657 10.762 18.774
% Share 2,3 3,6 2,7 2,5 2,3 1,7 1,5 2,2 3,2 1,7 2,9
 
Regarding CEE countries, inflows of foreign capital were vital as they 
accelerated growth and development. The importance of FDI is obvious 
considering its proportion to total fixed capital formation. CEE applicants 
benefited from the impact of enlargement, since the announcement made by EU at 
Essen European Council in 1994, as this introduced more foreign capital inflow. 
Comparing with the world and developed economies, FDI comprises larger 
proportions of total investment for each year since 1994 for CEE accession 
countries. (Table 2)  
 
Table 2: FDI inflows as percentage of Gross Fixed Capital 
Source: UNCTAD 
%
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
World 4.5 5.3 5.9 7.3 10.7 15.9 19.6 11.9 10.3 8.1 7.3
Developed economies 3.5 4.5 4.8 6.0 10.4 16.4 21.4 11.8 10.9 7.9 6.1
European Union 5.6 7.4 7.1 8.7 16.3 27.6 40.7 22.6 23.7 16.0 8.8
CEE Applicants 12.3 19.6 14.2 15.7 18.6 22.1 25.1 21.8 25.1 10.2 15.2
Czech Republic 7.4 14.7 7.4 7.7 21.6 39.7 32.4 33.6 43.2 8.7 15.4
Estonia 33.6 20.7 12.5 19.5 35.0 22.1 27.6 33.7 14.1 34.5 29.6
Hungary 27.4 57.0 34.1 41.0 30.0 28.8 25.2 32.3 19.7 11.7 18.6
Latvia 39.5 26.7 41.0 49.3 21.5 20.7 21.7 6.4 11.4 11.2 16.7
Lithuania 1.9 5.3 8.8 15.7 34.5 20.2 17.7 18.2 25.5 4.6 15.8
Poland 10.5 15.5 15.1 14.5 15.9 18.4 23.8 14.9 11.4 10.8 14.5
Slovakia 6.6 5.3 5.5 3.2 8.8 7.1 36.6 26.3 61.1 8.0 11.1
Slovenia 4.0 3.6 4.0 7.5 4.3 1.9 2.8 7.7 32.7 5.1 6.5
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Barry (2002) emphasized that, much of the FDI flows into CEE have been 
“market seeking”, rather than reflecting an attempt to integrate the production of 
these transition economies into EU production networks. Holland et al (2000) 
conclude that home-market size and growth potential were driving forces behind 
CEE-bound FDI in the first decade of transition. According to a study carried out 
for the European Commission by Boeri and Brücker (2000), previously 
underdeveloped non-tradable sectors, such as utilities, transport and 
communications, trade, financial intermediation and other services attracted 
almost half of FDI flows in the transition economies. The main investment motive 
here is to supply domestic markets and exploit first-mover advantages in markets 
with limited or nonexistent competition. 
The economic and political system of the CEE countries had been 
organized according to the system of socialism. From an economic point of view, 
accession to the EU means a transformation to implement market economy. 
Studying FDI statistics of CEE countries, it is evident that in the accession period 
most of the FDI flows were concentrated in Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. In Bevan and Estrin (2000), the impact of Essen announcement on FDI 
inflows to CEE countries is analyzed and they reach the conclusion that a 
significant increase of FDI was realized by especially Hungary, Czech Republic 
and Poland. The FDI performance of Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland stand 
out as they implement a successful privatization strategy and export oriented FDI 
policies. Holland and Pain (1998) examined in depth why Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic have been more successful at attracting FDI than other 
neighboring countries. According to them, they are among the largest regional 
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economies and were the fastest to recover from the transitional recession. They 
state that as a result of liberalizing earlier, restructuring and stabilizing their 
economies and political systems faster, these three countries have afforded 
investors’ access to relatively large, fast growing and stable markets. Moreover, 
Holland and Pain (1998) pointed out that these countries were also among the first 
ones to begin membership negotiations with the EU. In this study they implied 
that the perception of not-so-distant EU membership helped to reduce the level of 
risk associated with these countries, relative to other countries in the region and 
this, too, has encouraged investment. As a conclusion they emphasized that the 
proximity to the EU membership and also privatization path helped them to draw 
FDI. Moreover, Zacharov and Kusic (2003) denoted that these countries display 
high FDI performance due to faster compliance with the two economic criteria -
which are establishment of a well functioning market economy and capacity to 
withstand the competitive pressures and market forces within EU- for EU 
accession and can start the integration process earlier.  
Figure 1: Total FDI Inflows to CEECs between 1995-2004 
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In order to see the real affect of FDI in these countries’ economies, the 
periods between 1994 and 2004 should be analyzed since the former can be seen 
as a milestone in the accession process while the latter is the year of accession to 
the EU.  There is a rapid increase in the stock of FDI in Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland in this period of time. As shown in Table 3, in Czech Republic while 
the stock of FDI accounted for 9% of GDP in 1993, it reached to 52,7% of GDP 
in 2004. And also in Hungary there is an increase from 14,3% to 25,4%. A similar 
situation took place for Poland as the ratio raised from 2,9% to 25,4 %. These 
three countries received about 60 % of annual inflows to the region in 2004.   
 
Table 3: Stock of FDI 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland R Czech Republic n Hungary Poland
1993  9,0  14,3  2,9 - - -
1994  10,2  16,9  3,7 32,8 27,1 44,6
1995  13,1  25,3  5,9 61,7 59,5 107,0
1996  13,7  29,4  7,7 16,6 17,5 46,2
1997  16,1  39,3  9,7 7,7 35,3 27,3
1998  23,3  44,1  13,5 55,7 15,4 54,0
1999  29,5  48,4  16,1 22,1 12,2 16,1
2000  38,9  49,0  20,9 23,3 -1,7 31,3
2001  44,4  52,9  22,5 25,2 19,8 20,5
2002  52,6  55,8  25,6 42,7 32,2 17,1
2003  50,1  58,4  26,7 17,1 33,4 14,4
2004  52,7 60,7 25,4 24,6 24,9 11,1
Cumulative FDI as % of GDP % Change in Real Stock FDI
Source: World Investment Report 2005,UNCTAD
 
In this time period, although there had been a significant amount of inward 
FDI to these countries, the amount of inflow fluctuated during the accession 
period. In 2002 while the overall FDI inflows to the candidate countries was $22,6 
billion; it declined to $10,7 billion in 2003. In UNCTAD’s 2004 report it is 
implied that this was almost entirely due to the end of privatization in the Czech 
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Republic and Slovakia. In the rest of the other countries, the decline in FDI 
inflows was smaller (UNCTAD 2004). 
 
Figure 2: FDI Inflows, to Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
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It can be claimed that the prospec
 from member states to candidate countries in the negotiation period. In an 
article executed by Lovino (2002), FDI transactions to candidate countries from 
1996 to 2000 were investigated and it was stated that 87 % of FDI inflows to the 
candidate countries came from the EU member states in the year 2000. This is an 
important investigation since it proves that intra-EU FDI transactions had 
increased within this period. According to the level of concentration, the author 
implied that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were the destinations for 
the majority of the total FDI.  
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2.2. European Union Accession Process, FDI and Turkey 
 
Turkey’s formal relations with the EU date back to the 1963 Association 
Agreement and the country was the first of the current group of applicants to 
apply for EU membership back in 1987. For a variety of political and economic 
reasons, the request made little progress over the years, until the Helsinki Summit 
in December 1999. At that meeting, EU Governments formally recognized Turkey 
as a candidate country. On October 3rd 2005, membership negotiations were 
opened with Turkey. Right after the EU Accession Negotiations have been 
launched, Screening Process is started, which is expected to finalize within a year. 
 
2.2.1. Turkey’s FDI Performance Over Time 
The key objective of this section is to analyze Turkey’s performance in 
attracting FDI both over time and relative to CEE countries by making 
implications for EU accession process. 
Despite her renowned economic potential and geographic advantages, 
Turkey has performed quite poor in attracting FDI. There are various reasons such 
as the domestic and regional unrest in politics, international embargos to potential 
trading neighbors, reluctance of the bureaucracy for facilitating FDI regulations, 
domestic and international economic crises, highly volatile currency and the 
uncertainty related to the fundamental revisions in the banking system. Although 
Turkey is a high potential country to attract FDI (as the largest economy in the 
region), it is a striking fact that the country has failed to attract expected levels of 
FDI. 
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In its World Investment Report (WIR) for 2004, UNCTAD provides three 
indicators that measure the performance of a country in attracting FDI.  These are 
the transnationality index - a measure of relative economic importance of foreign 
affiliates in total economic activity - the FDI performance index and the FDI 
potential index. In 2001, Turkey ranked seventh from the bottom in the 
transnationality index of developing countries with Hong Kong having the first 
position; while in 2002, Turkey ranked sixth from the bottom among developing 
countries. UNCTAD provides a matrix based on the FDI performance and 
potential indices.  For 1988–90, 1993–95 and 2000–02 periods, Turkey ranked 
among the under-performers.  
Table 4: FDI Matrix 
 
 
 High
High FDI Performance Low FDI performance
 FDI potential Front-runners Below potential
Low FDI potential Above potential Under-performers
 
It will not be an incorrect statement to imply that the history of FDI for 
Turkey starts in 1980, which is the year of liberalization. Up until 1980, the 
cumulative level of FDI had amounted to $228 million with an average annual 
inflow of $90 million (Erdal and Tatoğlu, 2002), which is a negligible amount.  
In a study carried by Hadjit and Moxon-Browne (2005), an overview of 
FDI in Turkey took place. They summarize the FDI performance of Turkey with a 
special analysis of the economic and political environment.  In this study it is 
stated that by January 1980, Turkish governments started to implement reform 
programs to open up the Turkish economy in the aim of establishing a free 
market, and an outward-oriented economy to integrate Turkey with world 
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markets. In 1989, Turkey fully liberalized its capital account, which led to a 
significant increase on FDI flows. Despite this increase, Turkey was still 
attracting relatively low levels of FDI compared to countries of comparable size 
such as Argentina and Mexico (Balasubramanyam, 1996). Hadjit and Moxon-
Browne (2005), gave some FDI figures for the years between 1980 and 1990. The 
authorized investment amounted to $6.4 billion in this period while the average 
value per year was $456.3 million in the same period according to data from 
General Directorate of Foreign Investment. According to them, the period of 
1990s was thought to be crucial for Turkey as Customs Union (CU) with the EU 
came into force in January 1996. In this period it was a widespread belief that CU 
would stimulate flows of European FDI into Turkey because of the increased 
stability and competitiveness of the Turkish economy. However, the realization 
was totally different than the forecasts as the CU had a significant impact only on 
authorized investment between 1995 and 1997 whereas the realized FDI did not 
meet the expectations. Many investments, especially in the manufacturing sector, 
were announced but did not materialize. This was apparently an outcome of the 
difference between the optimism due to the CU membership and what happened 
in reality. It was clearly understood that CU is not enough to secure macro-
economic stability and ensure FDI inflows. Moreover, the underdeveloped 
investment climate could not convert the investors’ positive perceptions into 
reality. Also, Loewendahl & Ertugal-Loewendahl (2001) analyzed this period in 
their study and mentioned that, during the 1990s when global FDI flows 
accelerated, FDI in Turkey remained static.  According to them the most 
interesting finding is the 1995-1997 period that Turkey and EU formed a CU in 
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which the largest gap between the approved and realized investment occurred.  
They think that investors’ perceptions of the opportunities afforded by investing 
in Turkey did not meet the reality of the situation and most of the new investment 
was not realized which indicates that the government was unable to facilitate the 
large interest shown by inward investors into real investment. (Loewendahl, 
Ertugal-Loewendahl, 2001) 
Figure 3: FDI in Turkey 
 
December 1999 was another milestone for Turkey since the EU accepted 
Turkey
 
 * As of June 2003 
Source: Turkish Treasury  
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 as candidate member on this date. From then on, the image of Turkey in 
foreign investors’ mind turned out to be a potential location to invest, as Turkey 
had to meet economic, political and social criteria on her way to EU. However, 
this positive understanding changed when an economic crisis occurred in 2001, 
which caused a sharp downturn of Turkish economy. The country faced a severe 
banking crisis that led to the elaboration of a stabilization program supported by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This crisis acted as a brake on FDI. The 
FDI stock between 1995 and June 2002 was $9 billion, but $3 billion of this 
amount was due to a large license fee paid by Telecom Italia to operate Aria and 
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HSBC’s purchase of Demirbank in 2001 (Hadjit and Browne, 2005). During this 
period Poland attracted $42 billion; Czech Republic attracted $26 billion and 
Hungary attracted $26 billion of FDI (UNCTAD, 2005).  
Since 1990, Turkey has been able to attract one billion dollars of FDI on 
averag
.2.2 Competitor FDI Locations 
Loewendahl and Ertugal-Loewendahl (2001), 
Turkey
Figure 4: Turkey’s key competitors for FDI  
 (% of respondents citing country) 
Source: Loewendahl, H., and E. Loewendahl, 2001, “Turkey’s Performance In Attracting Foreign 
Direct Investment: Implications of EU Enlargement” 
 
e per year while the estimated minimum annual FDI “attraction potential” 
according to the world investment report of 2002 is $35 billion.  
 
2
In a research executed by 
’s key competitors for FDI were examined. Although they have a different 
economic background from Turkey, the CEEC constitute fierce competition for 
Turkey in attracting FDI; the main competitors being Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary.  In this respect, they conducted interviews with 30 senior executives 
of multinational corporations and directed the question: “Which countries is 
Turkey competing with as a location for FDI?” Below is the summary of results: 
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 28
The figures show that Eastern Europe countries are by far the most cited 
competitors of Turkey in FDI attracting. The fact that North Africa and Russia & 
CIS regions follow as second and third; indicates that geographical location of a 
country is important for defining its competitors. Another common attribute of 
these countries is the similarity of their economic development levels. The study 
further states that Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic were the top countries 
cited as the main East European competitors to Turkey. It is interesting to note 
at Latin America and Asia were not considered as key competitors of Turkey. 
According to the results of the research, Lowendahl and Ertugal-Lowendahl 
suggested that MNCs actually segment the European market into West and East, 
most likely due to different levels of economic development (and also into North 
and South for activities such as call centers and shared service centers, due to 
geographical and cultural differences). These institutions also tend to adopt a 
regional division of labor within Europe. This is derived from the fact that CEECs 
and Turkey are competing for manufacturing activities and West European 
countries are competing for high tech manufacturing and knowledge intensive 
activities. 
In this study henceforth, Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland together 
will be considered, admitted and called, as the “main competitors” of Turkey and 
all the comparisons and analyses will be done between these countries and 
Turkey.  
Compared to its main competitors, Turkey attracted considerably low 
levels of FDI for the 1994–2004 period. Net FDI inflows to Turkey amounted to 
less than one percent of GDP except 2001; while within this period, the Czech 
th
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Republ
e of GDP is significant since it represents the share of total FDI 
operati
(%) Chezh 
1995 0.5% 4.6% 11.4% 2.8%
1997 0.4% 2.3% 9.1% 3.3%
2000 0.5% 9.0% 5.9% 5.7%
2003 0.7% 2.3% 2.6% 2.0%
Source: UNCTAD
ic and Hungary attracted noticeably higher amounts of FDI as percentage 
of GDP (Table 5). One of the other indicators in explaining FDI and its reflections 
to the country’s economy is the FDI instock data. To measure FDI instock as 
percentag
ng in a country’s economy cumulated up to date. In Turkey, inward FDI 
stock as percentage of GDP did not show significant increases from 1994 to 2004 
while it increased from 10,2% to 52,7% in Czech Republic; 16,9% to 60,7% in 
Hungary and 3,7% to 25,4% in Poland (Table 6). Comparing with its main 
competitor countries, it can be concluded that Turkey has attracted low amounts 
of FDI and has not realized a progress during a decade from 1994 (year of the 
announcement for eastern enlargement), to 2004 (year of entry to EU). 
Table 5: FDI Inflows as Percentage of GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turkey Republic Hungary Poland
1994 0.5% 2.0% 5.5% 1.8%
1996 0.4% 2.3% 7.3% 3.0%
1998 0.5% 6.0% 7.1% 3.8%
1999 0.4% 10.6% 6.9% 4.5%
2001 2.2% 9.2% 7.6% 3.1%
2002 0.6% 11.5% 4.6% 2.2%
2004 0.9% 4.2% 4.2% 2.5%
Table 6: FDI Instock as Percentage of GDP  
 
(%)
Turkey
Chezh 
Republic Hungary Poland
1994 10.8% 10.2% 16.9% 3.7%
1995 8.8% 13.1% 25.3% 5.9%
1996 8.7% 13.7% 29.4% 7.7%
1997 8.7% 16.1% 39.3% 9.7%
1998 8.7% 23.3% 44.1% 13.5%
1999 9.9% 29.5% 48.4% 16.1%
2000 9.6% 38.9% 49.0% 20.9%
2001 13.5% 44.4% 52.9% 22.5%
2002 10.2% 52.6% 55.8% 25.6%
2003 13.3% 50.1% 58.4% 26.7%
2004 11.7% 52.7% 60.7% 25.4%
Source: UNCTAD
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2.2.3.  FDI Flows and Trends to Turkey 
I, it stands out that EU countries 
stick out in dominating inward FDI to Turkey. For the 2002-2006 period, 
Netherlands, Germany and France, following USA, ere the major investors in 
Turkey in terms of approved investment. 
 
Table 7: Breakdown of FDI Capital Inflow to Turkey by Countries 
 
Upon analyzing the main sources of FD
w
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
m ch 
t y 
ttracted 
percent), 
455 555 1,025 4,991 6,800 13,826
                    86 142 73 391 196 888
France                                                        22 120 34 2,105 328 2,609
Netherl
United K
Italy                                                           241 1 15 692 41 990
Other European Countries (Excluding EU) 64 70 109 1,662 51 1,956
North America 9 58 97 115 523 802
52 36 89 407 586
6 61 26 116 216
Central America And Caribbean 0 0 -- 8 11 19
outh America 0 0 -- -- 1 1
sian 70 60 60 1,756 48 1,994
Gulf Arabian Countries 5 0 -- 1,675 20 1,700
70
224
Australia 0 0 -- 1 -- 1
2002 2003 2004Countries (mn $)
 
 
ands                                               72 50 568 267 4,842 5,799
ingdom                                        8 141 126 284 211 770
Other European Countries 26 101 209 1,252 1,182 2,770
Africa 0 0 -- 3 21 24
America 9 58 97 123 535 822
U.S.A. 2
Canada 7
 
 
Source: Turkish Treasury 
 
Table 8 shows the breakdown of FDI by sectors and sub-sectors. 
Manufacturing and services dominate FDI in Turkey and there has not been 
change in their share of total FDI over time. The distribution of FDI permi
sector indicates that between 1954 and 2005, wholesale and retail sector a
the biggest share, with 36.7 percent, followed by services (31.9 
manufacturing (21.7 percent), mining (1.7 percent) and agriculture (1.3 percent).  
Unclassified 24 2 -- 1 7 34
622 745 1,291 7,381 7,462 17,501
*Provisional Data  (As of June 2006)         
Total
European Union (25)
Germany                                
2006* Total2005
S
A
Near And Middle Eastern Countries 0 1 54 3 12
Other Asian Countries 65 59 6 78 16
u
s b
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 Table 8: The Breakdown of FDI by Sectors (1954-2005) 
Turkey since 
who chose 
he majority 
 between the years 
does not 
lishments during these years. 
 
 
 
* As of October 2005, Provisional Data 
Source: General Directorate of Foreign Investment 
 
The total number of companies that have realized FDI in 
1954 is 13,600. Regarding the forms of FDI, foreign capital companies 
to undertake greenfield investments in Turkey since 1954 have had t
with 79%. In terms of the amount they invested, only the period
2000-2003 can be analyzed due to lack of data. Although this analysis 
provide us a perfect benchmark, it is significant as it gives an understanding of the 
Transport, Storage and Communication 994 8,5%
Financial Intermediation 156 1,3%
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 1.156 9,9%
Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social Security 31 0,3%
Education 53 0,5%
Health and Social Work 147 1,3%
Other Community, Social and Personel Service Activities 262 2,2%
Activities of Households 3 0,0%
Extra-territorial Organizations and Bodies 4 0,0%
TOTAL 11.707 100%
SECTOR NUMBERS FDI
Fishing 21 0,2%
Manufacturing 2.539 21,7%
Chemicals and Chemical Products 292 2,5%
Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers 190 1,6%
Other 963 8,2%
lectricity, Gas and Water 113 1,0%
onstruction 658 5,6%
Wholesale and Retail Trade 4.293 36,7%
31,9%
7,9%
% OF TOTAL 
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 154 1,3%
Mining and Quarrying 197 1,7%
Food Products and Beverages 255 2,2%
Textiles 355 3,0%
Machinery and Apparatus 192 1,6%
Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 169 1,4%
Furniture 123 1,1%
E
C
Services 3.732
Hotels and Restaurants 926
decline in the amount of new estab
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2.2.3. Reasons Behind Turkey’s Underperformance 
 
From a historical perspective, Turkish economy has failed 
economic potential and faced several financial crises. For the last 
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Figure 5: Mode of Establishment (Number of Companies), 1954-2006* 
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* As of July 
 
Source: Undersecretariat of Treasury 
 
Figure 6: Mode of Establishment (mn $) 
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to realize its 
the economy has been suffering from a high inflationary environment. (Yilmaz 
003). Even though various governments have tried to apply policies to decrease 
e rate of inflation, it is still higher than all CEE countries and has been 
covering just since 2004. While it was 25% in 2003, it came down to 10% in 
004, when Turkey performed better than Romania (as it was 11,9% in Romania). 
Table 9, Table 10) Moreover, Turkey’s external debt is mentioned as another 
 Tosunoğlu (2005). They claim that Turkey’s 
xternal debts prevent a decrease in the real interest rates to the desired levels and 
etary deficit, which has a 
irect 
 
 
2
th
re
2
(
crucial problem by Başar and
e
increase the country risk. They suggest that the budg
d effect on country risk, stems from inefficient tax collection, deficits in 
social security systems, insufficient privatization efforts, the problems of the 
public sector enterprises and undisciplined expenditures.   
 
 
Table 9: Key Economic Indicators, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(billion US$) Annual(%) Atlas Method* (US$) Total (mn US$) (%)
Check Republic 90,6 3,2 7.160 34.629 -0,1
Hungary 83,1 3,4 6.410 45.794 4,7
Lithunia 18,4 10,5 4.540 8.342 -1,1
Slovakia 32,7 4,5 4.970 18.378 8,4
Slovenia 27,7 2,7 11.870 11.512 5,7
Bulgaria 19,9 4,5 2.120 13.288 2,3
Romania 57,3 5,2 2.260 21.280 15,3
Source: World Development Indicators (2006), Eurostat 
Countries
GDP  GDP Growth GNI Per Capita, External Debt Inflation 
Estonia 9,2 6,7 5.480 6.972 1,4
Latvia 11,1 7,2 4.380 8.802 2,9
Poland 209,8 3,8 5.270 95.219 0,7
Turkey 240,4 5,8 2.800 145.662 25,3
Crotia 28,8 4,3 5.380 23.451 ..
2003
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Table 10: Key Economic Indicators, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turkey’s failure to attract FDI has both economic and non-economic 
auses (FIAS, 2001a; FIAS, 2001b). ). Erdilek (2003) focuses on these causes and 
entions: high transactions costs of entry and operation for foreign investors (due 
 excessive bureaucracy and red tape, and widespread corruption), lack of 
nfrastructure. 
t t lead 
conflicts
politica
of FD
-owned and
controlled and closed to foreign takeovers). (Erdilek, 2003) 
GDP   
(billion US$)
GDP Growth 
Annual(%)
GNI Per Capita, Atlas 
Method (US$)
External Debt 
Total (mn US$)
Inflation 
(%)
Check Republic 107,0 4,7 9.130 45.561 2,6
Estonia 11,2 7,8 7.080 10.008 3
Hungary 100,7 5,2 8.370 63.159 6,8
Latvia 13,6 8,5 5.580 12.661 6,2
Lithunia 22,3 7,0 5.740 9.475 1,2
Poland 242,3 5,3 6.100 99.190 3,6
Slovakia 41,1 5,5 6.480 22.068 7,5
Slovenia 32,2 4,2 14.770 3,7
Turkey 302,8 8,9 3.750 161.595 10,1
Bulgaria 24,1 5,6 2.750 15.661 6,1
Crotia 34,3 3,8 6.820 31.548 ..
Romania 73,2 8,4 2.960 30.034 11,9
Source: World Development Indicators (2006), Eurostat 
Countries
2004
c
m
to
inward protection of intellectual property rights, failure of privatization, 
orientation until 1980, insufficient legal structure and inadequate i
According to him there are also non-economic factors peculiar to Turkey 
to attract low FDI such as chronic political instability for years, internal 
historical animosity towards foreign economic presence, fear of foreign 
domination within the civilian and the military bureaucracy, lack 
promotion, and the structure of Turkish business (mostly family
ha
, 
l 
I 
 
In 2001, Foreign Investment Agency Service (FIAS) of World Bank 
carried out a study to present an analysis of the FDI environment in Turkey. They 
implemented some interviews with potential investors and asked them to grade 
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major obstacles to FDI in Turkey. In Hadjit and Browne (2005), these results are 
presented. Those investors declared that, up until early 2000s, they were 
confronted by economic and political instability, government bureaucracy, a weak 
judicial system, taxation, corruption, deficient infrastructure and the informal 
economy while investing. (Figure 7)  
 
Figure 7: Major obstacles of FDI in Turkey 
 
 
Source: Hadjit, A., E. Mexon-Browne, 2005, “Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey: The 
dy 
 
 the Turkish Market 
There are numerous studies about FDI story of Turkey. Although it is a 
widely discussed topic from different perspectives, almost all studies compromise 
on the consensus that despite its advantages, Turkey is performing far below its 
potential in attracting FDI. This statement is more than a hypothesis hence the 
 
Implications of EU Accession” from FIAS stu
 
 
2.2.4. Opportunities for Foreign Investors in
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potentiality issue can be supported with the realities of Turkey’s economic and 
social structure.  
In a working paper executed by TÜSİAD for the Investors Advisory 
Council Meeting (2004), Turkey was denoted as a potentially appealing country 
for foreign investors. As one of the advantages, the study mentions that Turkey 
has a huge domestic market and is among the biggest emerging markets with a 
unique location at the crossroads between East and West, overlapping Europe and 
Asia geographically. Moreover, the importance of the proximity to the new 
merging markets in Middle East and Central Asia is emphasized in the sense that 
 for foreign investors by providing an 
pportunity to develop business with these countries as well. Another opportunity 
rgy sources. 
Althou
 when compared with its competitors. Moreover, “the potential 
active 
e
it creates unique business opportunities
o
well worth to mention about Turkey is its location as a gateway of ene
gh it depends on the type of business; production and distribution facilities 
stand out as main concerns while investing in a region. In this regard the study 
highlights that Turkey, at the gateway of Middle East and Caspian petroleum and 
Central Asian natural gas to the west, appears to be a good choice for investing. 
Besides, communication and transportation infrastructures are considered as 
highly supportive
labor force” of Turkey is concerned as a demographic opportunity with 
stabilized population growth, increasing households and labor supply; improving 
welfare and per capita income.  
As already mentioned in the “Determinants of FDI” chapter of this study, 
economic structure of a country is the most underlying factor that affects FDI. In a 
study published by Başar and Tosunoğlu (2005), it is stated that Turkey has many 
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advantages compared to other CEE countries in respect of GDP and GDP growth 
rates. GDP figures are important, since they are accepted as the indicators of 
market size. Likewise, they affirm that Turkey has many other advantages, being 
located in a strategic location, having an educated and qualified work force, 
communication and other infrastructures that are compulsory to meet the needs of 
investors and lower cost of labor.  
Despite all these advantages, for several years, Turkey has experienced 
lower levels of FDI in comparison not only to its main competitors but also its 
potentiality. As already mentioned, one of the major aims of this study is to 
explain the FDI performance of Turkey in comparison to its main competitors, 
with a specific focus on 1994-2004 period, as it is the negotiation period with EU. 
Therefore it becomes significant to understand the economic and social structure 
and the investment environment of Turkey within this period. There were 
econom
as come down to historic lows; six zeroes have 
been d
ic and political challenges that Turkey has undergone such as three 
economic and financial crises linked to political problems in the recent past.  But 
so far, Turkey has recovered relatively well from the most recent 2001 crisis. In 
2002, Turkey recovered quite well with a GDP increase of 7.8%, compared to 
previous year’s -9.5%. (Huges, 2004) In 2003, growth was 4.8% and it increased 
to 8.9% in 2004. (Table 9 and Table 10) 
In a Deutsche Bank Research (2005), it is discussed that since the 2001 
economic crisis, economic reform programs in force have yielded tangible results: 
conventionally high inflation rate h
ropped from the Turkish Lira; financial sector supervision has been 
strengthened; more than half of the privatization revenues have been secured in 
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this period and the FDI stock has increased significantly. All these positive 
developments contribute to the perception of higher economic stability in the 
country.  
In a working document prepared by Commission of European 
Communities (2004), it is denoted that the perspective of EU membership 
triggered substantial FDI from EU companies into the ten new Member States, 
which joined the EU in May 2004. Therefore, it can be defended that EU prospect 
for Turkey is set to underwrite substantial increase in terms of FDI. The EU 
membership will bring Turkey the access to large EU market, increased growth 
prospects and access to structural funds. Hadjit and Moxon-Brrowne (2005) 
indicate that the opening up of negotiations might boost investors’ confidence by 
removi
Figure 8: FDI Net Inflows to Turkey  
*As of July 2006 
ng uncertainty in political and economic stability. In fact, the EU 
membership and even the membership process itself produce substantial positive 
effects for the economies of the member and candidate countries. 
 
 
Source: GDFI 
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With all these advantages, Turkey has been facing a different progress 
since 2005. According to a report published by GDFI; 2005 was the year of 
historical top in Turkey’s FDI attractiveness. Total inflow in this year was 
approximately 9,8 billion US $ which has risen by 3,5-fold of 2004. Regarding its 
compounds, while 7,9 billion US $ is capital inflow, 1,8 billion $ is the foreigner’s 
purchase of real estate in Turkey. Growth rate, improvement in macroeconomic 
gures (inflation rates, interest rates…etc.), effect of negotiation process with the 
EU and also the structural reforms for improving investment environment helped 
Turkey attract more FDI. It is understood that many investors were on hold with 
their investment plans before the materialization of EU road map.  In this period, 
the acquisitions in finance sector and the foreign investors’ interest on 
privatization tenders verify Turkey’s increasing attractiveness.  
At this point, it is argued that whether the major portion of FDI inflow to 
Tur eriod is privatization-induced or not. Before analyzing Turkey’s 
experience about privatization, it would be worthwhile to mention the discussions 
on privatization-induced FDI in literature. In Nunnenkamp (2002), the 
contribution of privatization on the composition of FDI flows is mentioned and 
structural shifts are analyzed. According to the study, while one of the structural 
shifts was the rising share of FDI in services, as privatization involved in service 
industries in the first place (in Latin America case), the other shift was 
experienced in the growing importance of mergers and acquisitions, as opposed to 
greenfield investment. The study dealt with the controversial discussions on 
privatization-induced FDI. For instance, this type of FDI is frequently assumed to 
leave the overall volume of investment unaffected. This argument is confirmed in 
fi
key in this p
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the sense that M&As, in contrast to greenfield investment, are no more than a 
change in owners ip. As a second argument, from a competition-policy point of 
view, privatization-induced FDI might be problematic when pub
h
lic assets are sold 
to dom
 a  
estic private investors. In this type of privatization, a state monopoly would 
be replaced by a private monopoly. As a third argument, privatization-related FDI 
is often believed to be a nonrecurring event. However Nunnenkamp argues that 
this is not necessarily true s any change can occur in ownership, which has been 
associated with significant additional investment in the rationalisation and 
modernization of privatized firms. Finally, privatization programs help improve 
the climate for FDI in indirect ways by indicating the government’s commitment 
to economic reform. Hence, the author concludes that privatizations-related FDI 
may prove to be the gateway to higher FDI inflows on a regular basis.  
Coming back to Turkey’s case; privatization,  as one of the most essential 
forms of FDI, has been on Turkey's agenda since 1984. Between 1984 and 2006, 
$25.7 billion worth of state shares has been privatized in the country. The cash 
proceeds from these sales have been recorded as $14.3 billion. 
From a historical view, in 1980’s, Turkey was one of the early countries to 
initiate privatization programs. Although a fast head start was given in these 
years, it was not possible to maintain this speed due to political and economic 
turbulences, as well as opposition from public opinion and bureaucracy. As a 
result, the privatization performance lagged behind that of the Eastern European 
countries, which had undertaken similar programs as late as the early 1990's.  
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 Figure 9: Privatization in Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As seen in the above chart, more than half of the total privatization value 
was realized before 2005 in Turkey. Of these years, only 2000 was a year that 
witnessed considerable sales, when POAŞ and TUPRAS privatizations took place. 
Turkey´s privatization agency wrote a record in the year 2005, when the 
privatization revenue turned out to be $8,2 billion. Of this, $6,5 was realized by 
the sale of controlling interest in Turkish Telekom to Saudi telecoms operator 
Oger. In 2006 up-to-date, $8 billion worth of privatization has been realized; of 
Erdemir 
 a 
6% 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Privatization Agency of Turkey 
 
which $4,1 billion arrived through the Tüpraş and $2,8 billion through 
offerings. Of these, Tupras’s 51% controlling shares were overtaken 
consortium of Koc Group (98%) and Shell Group (2%), whereas Erdemir’s 
shares were transferred to Oyak Group for $2,8 billion. (Hadjit, Maxon-Browne, 
2005) 
by
4
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In 2005 and 2006, the sharp increase in FDI was gained through 
rivatization. In 2005, privatization-induced FDI was recorded as 1,5 billion US$, 
which constitutes 18% of total privatization and 15% of total FDI inflow.  
 
Table 11: Privatization and FDI in Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GDFI, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1999 38 0
2001 2,579 2,369
2003 177 0
2005 8,216 1,500
p
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
mn $ Privatization Privatization-induced FDI
1995 515 1
1996 292 0
1997 466 0
1998 1,020 0
2000 3,302 585
2002 537 0
2004 1,267 49
Total 18,409 4,504
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3) ECONOMETRIC STUDY 
3.1. CEE Effect on Turkey’s FDI Attractiveness  
Using regression analysis, this study explores whether or not the FDI 
flow to Turkey is affected by the FDI inflows to main competitors; Hungary, 
oland, and Czech Republic. As mentioned previously, there are many factors 
ffecting FDI flow into a country such as the EU membership prospect. In this 
tudy, FDI inflows to the candidate countries are discussed to have boosted in 
eir negotiation period. As competitor locations, Hungary, Poland and Czech 
epublic have attracted more FDI than Turkey between 1994-2004.  The model 
ims to find whether or not Turkey attracted low levels of FDI just because of 
ese countries’ performance in attracting FDI from 1994 to 2004.  In other 
ords, while Turkey’s underperformance in attracting FDI in this period can be 
xplained by many reasons, can the FDI inflow to each competitor location and to 
all erperformance? In order to measure this 
ffect, FDI inflow data is placed in the model as percentage of GDP. Since these 
countries have different characteristics in terms of their economic size, the 
nominal amount of FDI inflow does not always explain the country’s real 
performance in attracting FDI.  
Data for FDI inflow and GDP (in millions of $ terms) are compiled from 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005. The FDI inflow as percentage of GDP 
is derived by own calculations for each country. In order to see if there is a change 
of FDI behavior in the negotiation period, the model includes dummy variable 
beginning from 1995 as the reflections of Essen European Council, which took 
place on 9th of December 1994, would be realized since that date. To make a more 
 
in
P
a
s
th
R
a
th
w
e
3 together be a reason for Turkey’s und
e
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accurate analysis, it would be better to put a wider range of data set. However, the 
FDI inflow as percentage of GDP can only be derived for the years between 
1990–2004, due to lack of data for the competitor countries. 
 
As a result, the Model (1) is formulated as follow: 
(a) TRGDPFDI = C(1) + C(2)*CRGDPFDI + C(3)*TRGDPFDI(-1) + 
C(4)*DUMMY 
(b) TRGDPFDI = C(1) + C(2)*HGDPFDI + C(3)*TRGDPFDI(-1) + 
C(4)*D
 (CRGDPFDI),  
 FDI Inflows to Hungary as percentage of GDP (HGDPFDI),  
 (PGDPFDI), 
 
SITE) 
F i
us year.  In order to reach a valid model, the diagnostic tests on 
the residuals implied that an AR(1) term should be included in the model. 
UMMY 
(c) TRGDPFDI = C(1) + C(2)*PGDPFDI + C(3)*TRGDPFDI(-1) + 
C(4)*DUMMY 
(d) TRGDPFDI = C(1) + C(2)*COMPOSITE + C(3)*TRGDPFDI(-1) + 
C(4)*DUMMY 
The variables used to explain Turkey’s FDI performance as percentage of 
GDP are as follows:  
 FDI Inflows to Turkey as percentage of GDP (TRGDPFDI) 
 FDI Inflows to Czech Republic as percentage of GDP
 FDI Inflows to Poland as percentage of GDP
 FDI Inflows to all 3 countries as percentage of their total GDP 
(COMPO
 TRGDPFDI (-1) deducts DI inflow to Turkey as percentage of GDP w th 
the previo
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 As seen from the above formulations, the initial aim is to measure the 
se 3 countries is measured by calculating the ratio of their total 
FDI in
is used to estimate the model. The estimation in E-Views 
gav represent 
the nce 
and
 the proportion 
(or 
variabl n is not satisfying. R-squared value is relatively higher in 
the
estimat  
independent variables affected Turkey’s FDI inflows in the past.  
 reveal different results than expected, since it 
was a 
the negotiation 
effect of each country. With another estimation, In (d), the effect of the FDI 
inflows to all the
flows to their total GDPs.  
OLS estimate 
e us the results in the tables in Appendix-A, Model (1). The tables 
results of the executed regression. Impact of each country’s FDI performa
 their aggregate FDI performance on Turkey are investigated.  
R-squared value is quite low for all estimations. Therefore
percentage) of the total variation in TRGDPFDI explained by the independent 
es in the regressio
 estimation for Czech Republic.  
Probability values for all coefficients of the associated t-values, in each 
ion, are insignificant. In other words, there is no evidence to prove that the
Another point well worth mentioning is the effect of dummy variable on 
the estimations. According to the findings, there is no significant difference of the 
effects of countries performance on Turkey before and after 1995. 
The findings of this study
widespread view that main competitors had diverted FDI from Turkey in 
this time period. However, it can be concluded that the coefficients are not 
significant, which means there is no correlation between Turkey’s 
underperformance and these countries’ FDI performance during 
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process
3.2
to divert FDI 
from 
 r , u
ection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as 
well as he capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the the 
obligat
.  According to the results of model, it is proved that Turkey drew less FDI 
than expected not because of its competitors’ performance but due to other 
reasons. 
 
. Impact of Economic Determinants on Turkey’s FDI Performance 
In the light of previous analysis, it is understood that Turkey did not attract 
low levels of FDI because of its main competitors who were thought 
Turkey between 1995 and 2004. Hence the study deserves further 
investigations to measure the impact of major economic determinants on Turkey’s 
FDI performance between 1996 and 2006.  
EU sets some economic and political considerations to candidate countries 
for convergence. On June 1993, in Copenhagen Summit, rules for defining a 
country’s sufficiency to enter the EU were declared under the name of 
Copenhagen Criteria. According to these ules a new member state m st meet 3 
criteria such as political, economic and acceptance of the Community acquis: 
“Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and, prot
 t
Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on 
ions of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic 
and monetary union."  (Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions, 1993) 
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Subsequently, The Maastricht criteria, which are assumed to sustain the 
European Union into the future, specify the economic conditions of the country 
for adm
 
is the 
major 
sure this effect, FDI inflow is inserted in the model as 
per
Bank o  years between 1996 and 2006. In 
ord
see if t eriod, the 
mo uarter of 2005.  As a 
resu
FD
 
ission to the Union: 
 An inflation rate no more than 1.5 percent above the average of the three 
countries with the lowest inflation rates 
 Nominal long-term interest rates not exceeding the average of three 
countries with the lowest inflation rates by more than 2 percent  
No exchange rate realignment for at least two years 
 Government budget deficit not in excess of 3 percent of GDP 
 Gross debt to GDP ratio does not exceed 60 percent 
Taking all these into account, the next model to be tested for Turkey states 
that FDI is influenced by the prospect of EU membership especially after the 
fourth quarter of 2005 since membership negotiations were opened on October 3rd 
of 2005.  In literature, it is considered that prospect of EU membership 
motive driving firms to invest in the accession period. The model aims to 
find whether or not Turkey’s FDI performance is affected by the starting of 
negotiations. In order to mea
centage of GDP. Data for FDI inflow and GDP were compiled from Central 
f Turkey. The estimation period includes
er to find a more accurate result, quarterly based data were used.  In order to 
here is a change of FDI behavior starting with the negotiation p
del includes dummy variable beginning from the 4th q
lt Model (2)a is formulated as follows: 
I = C(1) + C(2)*DUMMY + C(3)*FDI(-1) 
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FDI = 0.003804106096 + 0.08754459173*DUMMY - 1.009424265*FDI(-1) 
 
bership between 1996 and 2006.  
 associated t-value is significant. In 
Moreover, this model deserves further analysis to figure out the effect of 
ajor economic determinants of FDI inflow to Turkey especially to explain the 
FDI increase starting from 2005.  Another model is estimated by taking into 
In the above equation, FDI illustrates the FDI Inflows to Turkey as 
percentage of GDP. Dummy illustrates the effect of EU membership negotiations 
on Turkey’s FDI performance. In order to reach a valid model, the diagnostic tests 
on the residuals implied that an AR(1) term should be included in the model. OLS 
estimate is used to estimate the model. The estimation in E-Views for Model (2)a 
gave us the results in the table in Appendix-A, indicating the following 
relationship between FDI and prospect of EU membership:  
 
 
It is obvious that there is a significant positive relationship between FDI 
inflows and prospect of EU membership. R-squared value is approximately %88, 
which sustains a satisfying explanation for the correlation of Turkey’s FDI 
performance and prospect of EU mem
Probability value for dummy coefficient of the
other words, there is strong evidence to prove that the prospect of EU membership 
affected Turkey’s FDI inflows beginning from the 4th quarter of 2005.  Foreign 
investors understand that a country should meet economic and political criteria to 
start negotiations. Membership criteria require that an accession country improve 
and maintain economic soundness, harmonize the legal infrastructure with the 
Union’s Acquis and remove trade barriers. That’s why Turkey has started 
attracting considerable amounts of FDI since 2005.  
  
m
 49
accoun
t a
FDI = C(1) + C(2)*BUDGET + C(3)*GROWTH + C(4)*INF + (5)*OPENNESS 
 
orld Bank (2004), World 
Turkish Treasury. OLS 
stimate is used to estimate the model. The results are given in Appendix-A, 
lowing relationship between FDI and its 
determ
 
t the major economic determinants such as growth rate of the market, 
openness of the economy to foreign trade, budget deficit, and inflation in addition 
to the prospect of EU membership. Although these variables are not all the 
determinants o explain EU accession nd FDI inflows, the model is formed with 
these determinants due to lack of quarterly based data.  
 
+ C(6)*DUMMY + C(7)*FDI(-1) 
Similar to the previous models FDI inflow to Turkey is presented in the 
model as percentage of GDP (FDI). The economic performance of Turkey is 
measured as the real growth rate of GDP (GROWTH). Trade Openness shows the 
extent to which a country is open to international trade. It is calculated as the ratio 
of the sum of imports and exports to GDP. (W
Development Indicators) Although there are other methods to measure trade 
openness of a country, in this model World Bank method will be used 
(OPENNESS). Two variables are used to measure macroeconomic stability: 
Inflation (INF) and budget deficit (BUDGET). BUDGET is the ratio of budget 
deficit over nominal GDP. Similar to previous models, FDI (-1) is used to enable 
a valid model as the diagnostic tests on the residuals implied that an AR (1) term 
should be included. Data for the variables are compiled from the sources of 
Central Bank of Turkey, Turkish Statistical Institute and 
e
Model 2(b), indicating the fol
inants: 
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FDI = -0.000187 - 0.001523*BUDGET - 0.000145*GROWTH - 4.361994*INF + 
According to the findings of this model, the results are surprising in the 
sense that only trade openness and dummy variables (which refers to prospect of 
EU membership) are significant as having an impact on Turkey’s FDI 
performance. In the model R-squared is the best fit with %96. Probability values 
for dummy and openness coefficients are significant at 0,05 level.  Although 
Turkey has experienced successes in reducing inflation rate, fiscal adjustment 
process and considerable economic growth after the contraction in 2001, the 
model did not prove the correlation between these determinants and FDI inflow 
between 1996 and 2006. Despite many explanations for this finding, the prospect 
of EU membership (explained by dummy variable), which in fact includes all 
these determinants, is once more explained as the s rongest determ nant on 
Turkey’s FDI p
49869.54902*OPENNESS + 0.072284*DUMMY - 1.210342*FDI(-1) 
 
t i
erformance. In fact growth rate of an economy is a very important 
eterminant in foreign investors’ decisions as well as inflation rate and budget 
ith trade openness appears to have the most influential effect on Turkey’s FDI. 
The rea
m r
d
deficit. However, according to model, the prospect of EU membership together 
w
son of this finding could be the change in the perceptions of investors with 
the start of negotiations.  The prospect of EU membership might be viewed by 
potential investors as reducing country risk and eeting the equirements of EU 
admission, which represents an external validation of progress in transition. And 
this is also because ultimate EU membership implies guarantees in terms of macro 
economic stability, institutional and legal environment and political stability. 
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4) CONCLUSION 
FDI has become an important tool for national development for many 
developing countries. There is general agreement about the positive impacts of 
FDI on the welfare of receiving countries. On the other hand, it is possible to 
claim that there exist controversial views regarding the positive impact of FDI on 
the host country’s economic growth patterns. It seems rational to preliminarily 
accept that FDI can result in positive spillovers to the host economy. However it 
can also result in negative spillovers if it discourages domestic investment, as 
local firms cannot compete with foreign firms, and forces domestic enterprises to 
close down since they cannot obtain the necessary financing for upgrading their 
technology to compete (UNECE; Economic Survey of Europe, 2001). The 
opponents of FDI argue that MNCs transfer inappropriate technology to 
developing countries. Even worse, in a study executed by Woodward (2001), 
FDI’s effect on the host country’s balance of payments was discussed 
and ntribute to the underlying fragility of an economy and 
make i
negative 
 claimed that FDI can co
t more sensitive to balance of payments crises in different ways. First, he 
mentioned that the profits generated from the growing stocks of inward FDI 
would result as part of foreign exchange outflow. Secondly, FDI will lead to an 
increase in imports of capital goods. Thirdly he pointed out that current foreign 
exchange costs of MNCs outpace the foreign exchange they tend to earn through 
exports of import substitution. Finally, he emphasized the change in consumption 
patterns through foreign affiliates’ advertising strategies. According to 
Woodward, all of these ways lead to large current deficits, which tend to precede 
financial crisis. In a more recent study, Buckley, Clegg and Wang (2006) argued 
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that at greater levels of foreign presence in the economies, negative effects start to 
become apparent, and may begin o counteract the positive effects on local firms’ 
productivity. Foreign affiliates can draw demand away from their local 
counterparts through the introduction of new differentiated products and through 
price reductions, which in the end can deteriorate the productivity of local firms.   
Despite the controversial arguments about the impact of FDI on host 
economies, it is widely agreed that many countries in the transition period are 
enthusiastic in attracting more FDI since MNCs play significant role in 
transferring technology, creating employment, contributing the long-run 
productivity of local firms. According to the common view, FDI inflow also 
brings in capital and efficiency, produces spillover effects and contributes to the 
economic development of the country, providing mo t of the stimuli that fails to 
come from domestic sources. Expanding markets, low unit wage costs, skilled 
employees and stable economic and political environments lead foreign investors 
to transfer their capital to the accession countries (Deutsche Bank Research, 
2005). Although there are various determinants affecting FDI inflow to a country, 
it can be claimed that macroeconomic conditions and the politi al environm nt of 
the country are the most important determinants. Moreover, EU membership also 
has considerable influence on FDI in the sense that potential investors see it as a 
t
s  
c e
guaran
 c i
tee for economic and political stability. In this paper, EU accession process 
on candidate countries’ FDI performance was analyzed for both CEE countries 
and Turkey.  Since the start of their transition, the CEE countries have attracted a 
considerable amount of FDI. FDI inflows into CEE andidate countries ncreased 
sharply since 1994, after the EU announcement about eastern enlargement. The 
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focus will now probably shift from the previous group of candidate countries to 
the current EU accession candidates and other emerging markets. Taking into 
account this experience, this paper initially aimed to find out whether Turkey’s 
performance in attracting FDI was affected by its main competitors’ performance. 
Secondly, the study aimed to investigate the impact of EU accession process and 
major economic determinants on Turkey’s FDI. According to the findings, 
prospect of EU membership has the strongest impact on Turkey’s FDI 
performance.  
It was clearly seen that even the possibility of starting negotiations for 
Turkey was enough to draw in $9,8 billion of FDI in 2005 and $9,1 billion of FDI 
as of June 2006. It is very likely that others will follow these early settlers as the 
progress of EU accession further materializes. Although Turkey has achieved 9.8 
billion $ FDI in 2005, it is still performing under its potential. Turkey has not yet 
a large FDI stock, which means there is still further growth potential. On the way 
to the EU, Turkey will definitely adopt and implement the EU legislation and 
standards. Besides; securing political stability, targeting transparency and 
efficiency in bureaucracy and bringing the economic parameters in line with EU 
criteria will help Turkey develop its investment climate.  Further progress on each 
of these requirements and definitive prospect of EU membership should make 
Turkey very attractive for FDI with also other given strengths, which are highly 
skilled and adaptable labor force, large domestic market, and geographical 
proximity both to Europe and to the Middle East, Northern Africa and Central 
Asia markets.  
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The progress that Turkey has made over the past three years in meeting the 
convergence criteria to EU, has demonstrated the commitment and determination 
of the country towards EU membership. It is generally acknowledged that 
together with EU membership prospect, the Turkish economy has recently taken 
revolutionary steps towards a favorable investment climate, which in turn has 
yielded higher inflows of FDI in recent years. The next challenge lies in the 
sustainability of this picture, as it is required to maintain this positive outlook in 
the medium to long term.  
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